ELIHU ROOT

June 1916 Frederick James Gregg
ELIHU ROOT
June 1916 Frederick James Gregg

ELIHU ROOT

FREDERICK JAMES GREGG

And the Problem of the Next Secretaryship of State

FOR the first time in the history of political parties in the United States, a large proportion of the voters are considering the question of the next Secretary of State quite apart from the question of the next President. It is assumed that if the opposition to the present Administration is successful next November, direction of the foreign affairs of the nation will be placed once more in the hands of Elihu Root. In a word, a large proportion of straight Americans believe that if they get the chance to vote for Justice Hughes for President—or indeed whoever the new candidate for the highest office may be—they will also be expressing a preference with regard to the lower office.

ALL this is quite contrary to precedent. Our way has been to elect a President and leave it to him to construct his Cabinet to suit himself, no matter what might be the public needs. The extent to which the process was regarded as no business of the public is indicated by the common use of the expression "the White House official family." There is something nice and personal and private about the word "family"! True the Senate has the confirming power. But it has never been regarded as good form to be anything but polite to a new Chief Executive. So whenever there were surprises they were usually accepted with a shrug of the shoulders.

Col. Bryan's appointment as Secretary of State was a personal one. He was put in the seat of the mighty—the seat which he afterwards took away with him—because he had been useful at the National Convention four years ago. It was his activity which made the final choice of that gathering possible. A man with his views could never have been a Secretary of State under Lincoln or Cleveland. At the height of the Civil War Lincoln challenged England in the Lyon's despatch on the "Trent" affair. When quite unprepared Cleveland sent to Lord Salisbury his Venezuela ultimatum. Either of these would have sent a Bryan flying to the Executive Mansion waving his resignation and shouting, "Good-by and God bless you" at his chief.

Lincoln and Cleveland were their own Secretaries of State. Though both had very able Secretaries to help them. Part of the strength of both lay in the fact that with them an "ultimatum" was literally a "last word," to be taken as such, and not to be argued about. Both had a gift for keeping their grasp well within their reach. Both had a gift for unmistakably plain statement. Both faced conditions, and both had rather a contempt for theories. The public career of both might have been summed up in the homely words, "and when he says he'll do a thing he'll do it."

WHEN Elihu Root was made an honorary D.C.L. of Oxford, at the close of his term in the United States Senate, this honor—which Gladstone considered the highest one that he himself had received in the course of his long life—was no casual, or formal tribute to a famous American. It was conferred as a recognition of the work which Mr. Root had done as Secretary of State. In Great Britain, as on the continent of Europe, the Senator was regarded as the ablest expert in international affairs that this country had produced in his day and generation. Although he had only gone into the service of the Republic at the close of a long career at the bar, he was regarded as a match for any of the European statesmen who had given all their lives to the study and active practice of foreign affairs.

But it was his success in revolutionizing American relations with the suspicious and cold-hearted republics of South America that showed his quality most of all. His celebrated visit to the southern continent resulted in a radical change of attitude towards us on the part of the sister nations. The recent PanAmerican trade conference in Washington afforded a conclusive proof of the extent to which that missionary journey has continued to have results.

On that occasion there was made a reaffirmation of the Monroe Doctrine, which showed that, under circumstances of difficulty, South America was prepared to consider that the danger of one was the danger of all the Americas, and to act accordingly. It was an unpleasant surprise for certain of the "exchange professors," who set great store by their red eagles of the third class, to discover that the celebrated theory as to the undesirability of fresh European colonization in America still had practical vigor in it, and that it would not be relegated to the political scrap heap.

IT is admitted that the Central Empires, especially Germany, are greatly taken up with the trade questions which will follow the War. The greatest objection—from a Teutonic point of view—to bringing the United States into the contest, or even forcing America to break off diplomatic relations, is to be found in the fact that it would give us the right to sitting in the peace conference, as representing ourselves directly, and as the representatives, in an indirect way, of the interests of the South American republics. South America would have confidence in the ability of Mr. Root as chief envoy in the latter matter, just as his fellow citizens would have confidence in his skill in safeguarding their own claims.

America has been to such an extent the greatest neutral that the others hardly count in comparison. If Germany is to recuperate rapidly she must do so through neutral trade. The Allies are preparing for a real "boycott" for purposes of future safety. Eliminate the United States, or even assume the existence of obstacles placed by the United States in the way of trade with Germany, and the field for exchange will be contracted vastly. This is the difficulty which has attracted the attention of the bankers and business men of the Fatherland, who had been thrust into the background by the enthusiasts of the military party and the "gentlemen farmers" of Prussia.

IT used to be an article of belief of most Americans, just as it has always been of most Englishmen, that any man was good enough for any office. In our history we could match the British cases of Chancellors of the Exchequer who knew nothing about finance, and First Lords of the Admiralty who knew nothing about ships, and Governor-Generals of India who didn't know just whether Delhi was a river or a city. But bungling in European diplomacy and bungling in European conduct of the war have had this lesson* for Americans, as well as for people on the other side of the Atlantic.

The complacency with which so many think of Elihu Root as Secretary of State in the difficult and complicated period of international reconstruction which is coming soon or later, shows that a change has come over public opinion on the subject of fitness. If the highest talents and the greatest experience are available why not make the best of them, so long as irreparable damage may be wrought by doing the other thing? The man who improved the diplomatic service and reformed the consular service is also the man who, while Secretary of War, organized the staff of the army.

AMERICAN interest in the final settlement will not be confined by any means to questions arising out of the practical application of the Monroe Doctrine; to damages for losses suffered, or to rights at sea—on this last subject we have a bill against England. Russia is preoccupied with her present bright chance of getting a foothold on the Mediterranean at last. Great Britain and France, through the activities of the Boers, have cleared the way for dividing up between them the million square miles of territory owned by Germany in Africa before the war. So careful an expert as Sir Harry H. Johnstown even insists that if Germany had not desired further expansion in Africa there would have been no war.

To sum up, the next Secretary of State will have his work cut out for him as none of his predecessors had since the foundation of the Republic.